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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
WORK STOPPAGE - INJUNCTION
It has been generally held that in exercising its equity jurisdiction'
to provide injunctive relief, a court is free to impose conditions requir-
ing the maintenance of the status quo.2 However, in United States v.
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO),3 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) had proven a prima facie case of illegal work stoppage by
the air controllers, a union employed by the agency, it was improper for
a district court to condition its granting of a preliminary injunction in
favor of the government on the FAA's not taking any disciplinary action
against the striking workers.4
1 Equity jurisdiction refers to the power of a federal court to grant specific relief when
the remedy at law is inadequate. See Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 559 U.S. 500 (1959).
See also Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231 § 9, 36 Stat. 1088.
2 See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R.C., 363 U.S. 528 (1960),
where the Court further noted,
Conditions of this nature traditionally may be made the price of relief when the
injunctive powers of the court are invoked and the conditions are necessary to do
justice between the parties.
Id. at 531-32. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
3438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970).
4 The district court had issued the preliminary injunction enjoining the air controllers
from
in any manner continuing, encouraging, ordering, engaging, aiding or taking part
in any strike, work stoppage or slowdown or any inteference with or obstruction
to the movement or operation of any aircraft.
United States v. Air Traffic Controllers Org., 313 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). However,
it added a condition to the injunction. In Paragraph III, the court stated:
That the Federal Aviation Administration be and it hereby is directed until
further order of this court:
(a) To restore all defendants in the action who have returned to work to the
performance of the duties to which they were assigned prior to March 25, 1970,
not later than May 18, 1970.
(b) To withhold any further administrative actions in respect of suspensions, re-
movals or any other sanctions based upon the alleged work stoppage between
March 25, 1970 and April 14, 1970, against any employees who are defendants in
these actions and subject to the temporary injunction issued by this court.
Id. at 181.
In explanation of its decision, the district court noted,
[tihe order is based on the need for urgent resolution of the present work stoppage,
and the possibility that long hearings may be necessary to establish whether the
individual defendants are in contempt of the temporary restraining order and
whether there are circumstances which might mitigate any penalties for violation
of the order.
313 F. Supp. at 185. The court added a caveat:
[tihose who knowingly disobey a law must face the penalty for the violation.
They have no right to amnesty. Nevertheless, they are entitled to fair treatment
in the administration of penalties, to consideration of mitigating circumstances,
and to a procedure that is such, as far as the court can assure, as to make the
defendants think it is "fair."
id. at 187. From this conditional injunction, the government appealed.
The rationale for the court's enjoining the FAA from taking disciplinary action* was
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The circuit court in this case, however, did not base its decision on
purely equitable grounds. On the contrary, it was primarily concerned
with the common-law precedents in administrative law and the con-
struction of the statutes involved in the granting of power to the agency.
The court noted that an administrative agency "has the power to
discipline its own employees without judicial interference" and that
there was a very limited scope of judicial review in this area.5 Such a
holding is in general accord with earlier Second Circuit decisions. The
very statute which governs the FAA demands that the agency, in light
of the fact that it has the necessary expertise, carry out its activities in
the public interest, taking whatever disciplinary measures it deems
necessary. 7 Given this statutory demand, the Second Circuit has tradi-
tionally held that the courts should not interfere in the agency's dis-
ciplinary proceedings.8 The only basis for judicial review in such a
case is if the agency has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
For judicial review purposes, such an argument must mean that there
based on Leyden v. FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) which was then pending in
the federal district court. Leyden, in a class action on behalf of the members of PATCO
had sued the FAA seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining the Eastern Regional Direc-
tor from acting as an appeals official in connection with suspensions of the plaintiffs and
enjoining the agency from holding any hearing regarding the plaintiffs' appeals unless
certain specific procedural safeguards were afforded the plaintiffs, such as a recording or
taking a transcript of all proceedings. At the time that the district court granted the con-
ditional injunction in PATCO, the Leyden case was pending, thus explaining the district
court's decision to enjoin the FAA from taking disciplinary action against the controllers
until a decision was made concerning the propriety of the disciplinary proceedings used.
5 438 F.2d at 80.
6 See, e.g., McTiernan v. Gronouski, 337 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1964), a case concerning a
federal employee's efforts to have the courts review the administrative action of the Post
Office Department dismissing him as a postmaster. In dismissing his complaint, the court
noted,
The taking of disciplinary action against government employees, including the
invocation of the sanction of dismissal, is a matter of executive discretion, and is
subject to judicial "supervision only to the extent required to insure substantial
compliance with the pertinent statutory procedures provided by Congress" [foot-
notes omitted] . .. and to guard against arbitrary or capricious action.
Id. at 34.
7 The Administrator is authorized and directed to develop plans for and formulate
policy with respect to the use of the navigable air space; and assign by rule, regu-
lation, or order the use of the navigable air space under such terms, conditions,
and limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft
and the efficient utilization of such air space. He may modify or revoke such
assignment when required in the public interest.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1963).
8 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), where the court, in
denying a petition to restrain enforcement by the FAA of a regulation forbidding commer-
cial air carriers from utilizing pilots beyond the age of 60, stated,
It is not the business of courts to substitute their untutored judgement for the
expert knowledge of those who are given authority to implement the general
directives of Congress.
Id. at 898.
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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
was no reasonable cause for the exercise of judgment.9 In the PATCO
case the court found nothing arbitrary in the FAA's discipline of em-
ployees who had participated in an illegal work stoppage 0 and for that
reason felt that the district court had improperly restrained the FAA
from taking such action. To prevent the agency from taking any dis-
ciplinary action, in light of the statute's declaration of illegality of a
strike, seemed to the court to "fl[y] in the face of the statute.""
Prior to this case, the Second Circuit had not dealt with this partic-
ular issue. But, it would seem to be clear that the court's tendency in
earlier decisions has been toward judicial restraint in reviewing ad-
ministrative action.' 2 Futhermore, although the court did not so state,
it seems concerned with the question of "ripeness."1 3 The circuit court
implied that the district court had made a determination in a case
which was not yet ripe. The district court had restrained the FAA from
acting against the air controllers on the supposition that the disciplinary
procedures might be found to be improper in the Leyden case, then
pending before the district court. Without actually saying so, the cir-
cuit court intimated that to make such a determination was an error
because the FAA had not yet been proven guilty of improper conduct.14
9 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314 (1953); Norman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
10 The court is particularly concerned with strictly construing the federal statute
which reads:
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United
States... if he-
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government
of the United States....
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp V. 1965-69). The penalty for the violation thereof is up to a year
and a day imprisonment and a fine of up to $1,000. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (Supp V. 1965-69).
A large amount of controversy has developed over this particular statute. One court has
even held that this section violates the first amendment of the Unites States Constitution.
See Natl Assn of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 805 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal de-
nied, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
11438 F.2d at 82. In so stating, the court vacated Parapraph III of the injunction. In
his dissent, Circuit Judge Waterman took issue with the court's interpretation of the
statute. He noted that the district court had merely ordered the government to hold all
disciplinary measures in abeyance until the isues in Leyden were resolved and had not
restrained the FAA from ever bringing disciplinary action against the defendants.
12 See note 8 supra.
13 The ripeness doctrine is concerned with whether a case is a true justiciable con-
troversy at the time it is presented to the court. The court must determine if it would be
more advantageous to wait and see how the situation develops in the case, i.e., until the
case is "ripe." See, e.g., CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
14Subsequent to the district court's determination of PA TCO, the same court had
decided Leyden v. FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). The court held that the con-
trollers were entitled to have a transcript of all proceedings. It further held that the bal-
ance between the constitutional rights of employees and the needs of prompt discipline
must leave some discretion in the employing agucy. Where that balance would lie in the
Leyden case, however, could not be determined until the agency answered the complaint
and the issues had been explored. One month later, the government answered the coin-
1972]
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In deciding as it did, the court of appeals further rejected the ap-
pellee's contention that Paragraph III of the injunction was necessary
to protect the court's jurisdiction over the action before it. The ap-
pellees had cited a federal statute15 which permits the federal courts to
issue writs to aid their jurisdiction. The court here felt that any action
taken by the FAA against any of the defendants would have no detri-
mental effect on the court's jurisdiction. 16
While procedural safeguards are becoming a very significant area
in administrative law,17 the circuit court particularly avoided the entire
question. It was concerned basically with the interpretation of the
federal statute prohibiting illegal work stoppages and with the judicial
interference in administrative activities. For this reason, the case is in
line with precedents in the area and merely underlines the Second Cir-
cuit's tendency to exercise judicial restraint in interfering with adminis-
trative disciplinary proceedings.
SEC INVESTIGATION - DISCLOSURE
When an administrative agency gathers information or documents
in the course of an investigation, this information has usually been held
plaint and two weeks later it appealed the decision. All of these events had not transpired
at the time the district court granted the conditional injunction in PATCO.
15 The federal statute involved here was 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964), which states:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
Various courts have used this rationale in similar situations to affirm district courts' con-
ditional injunctions. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 1024 (10th Cir. 1970)
(Breitenstein, J., dissenting) which dealt with a protective order issued by the courts with
its injunctive relief, restraining FAA disciplinary action against air traffic controllers, pend-
ing disposition of issues of civil actions seeking permanent injunctions. The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the order was authorized for purposes of maintaining the district court's
jurisdiction over the parties.
The Second Circuit did not accept the same rationale. It agreed with the dissent in
Moore which argued:
The majority hold that the protective order effected a permissible restoration and
maintenance of the status quo and was issued in aid of the district court's jurisdic-
tion as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651. These reasons, considered either separately
or collectively, do not warrant the judicial encroachment on executive powers
which results from the protective order.
Id. at 1025.
In PA TCO the court quoted from the Supreme Court which stated in DeBeers Consol.
Mines Ltd. v. United States, 525 U.S. 212, 220 (1945),
Section 1651 cannot be used to allow a court to deal "with a matter lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit."
438 F.2d at 81-82.1 6 See 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE 54.10[5] at 106 (2d ed. 1966) which stated that
the court would retain subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
17 The case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), outlined the various procedural
safeguards required in an evidentiary proceeding prior to the termination of welfare bene-
fits. Its impact was undoubtedly felt -in the district court's decision in PATCO.
